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     Abstract 
 
This paper provides an explanation for several important features of informal credit 
contracts negotiated in economies where households often lack collateral, and where 
ready access to legal authorities and formal financial institutions is absent. Our analysis is 
the first to highlight the choice between loans with well-defined repayment periods (fixed 
durations) and those that are open-ended. We extend a Bulow-Rogoff type model of 
sovereign debt to situations where ability to repay may be private information and the 
enforcement mechanism is a choice variable. We argue that in lieu of collateral, non-
credit (social) exchange with lenders can be withdrawn to encourage loan repayment, and 
that households negotiate fixed-duration loans to postpone non-credit sanctions that a 
lender might otherwise impose when the borrower’s ability to repay is private 
information. Other differences in loan terms can be explained by the exclusive 
availability of community loan enforcement to lenders and borrowers residing in the 
same community. Drawing on a unique household-level survey, we find empirical 
support for our model’s explanation for duration and the size of loans, as well as 
borrower’s repayment behavior. 
 Informal Credit in Village Economies: Contract Duration with Personal and 
Community Enforcement 
 
Households residing in outlying villages of low-income rural economies often do 
not have access to formal financial institutions and legal authorities.  When these 
households need to borrow, they negotiate informal, self-enforcing loan agreements 
directly with other households (Ray, 1998; Fafchamps, 1999).  Loan terms in this 
setting are remarkably diverse.
1 Moreover, these contracts can be enforced in a number 
of ways, for example, using personal sanctions imposed by the parties to an agreement 
on each other, or with community sanctions imposed by other households as well.
2 
  In this context, Platteau (1991), Townsend (1995) and others have observed 
that some households negotiate loans with well-defined repayment periods while others 
select loans that have no agreed upon length or final date.  We refer to these as fixed-
duration loans and open-ended loans, respectively.  “Open-ended-ness” is generally 
assumed to be one of the defining attributes of a class of informal loans among 
households, often referred to as “quasi-credit,” which is used to facilitate mutual 
consumption insurance (Plateau and Abraham, 1987; Udry, 1990, 1994; Lund and 
Fafchamps 2000; Ligon et al, 2002).  Fixed duration loans, on the other hand, are 
taken to be synonymous with loans involving moneylenders or used for purposes of 
fixed investment.  
In this paper, we establish that this kind of stylized segmentation or matching 
between contract terms, loan purpose and lender types often does not hold.  We provide 
an alternative explanation for households’ choices between informal loan contracts that 
are open-ended and those that have fixed durations, one that highlights the 
informational environment in which contracting occurs and the role of alternative 
enforcement mechanisms, namely, personal and community enforcement.  The 
occupation of the lender and the purpose of the loan are entirely secondary factors. We 
                                                 
1 See Plateau and Abraham (1987), Udry (1990, 1994), Platteau (1991), Fafchamps (1992), Besley (1995) 
and Townsend (1995). 
2 See, for example, Grief (1993, 1994). 
  2 then test our theory with data on loan contracts from rural China in the 1930s.   In the 
rest of the introduction, we sketch out our basic argument. 
A central feature of small village economies, such as those that we study here, 
is that households interact repeatedly with each other. With fewer than 100 households 
in any given village in our sample, and with most families having lived in these villages 
for several generations, these households are typically well acquainted, and often are 
related to each other. They also often obtain goods and services from each other.  Non-
credit exchange between households, which includes social as well as market exchange, 
is an important feature of village life.   
In a different informal credit context, that of sovereign debt, Bulow and Rogoff 
(1989) and Cole and Kehoe (1994) show that non-credit exchange between countries 
that is made contingent on the borrower’s outstanding debt and repayment effort 
expands the range of sanctions available to the lender.  Non-credit exchange effectively 
plays the role of collateral in their analyses.  In the village economies we examine, non-
credit exchange between households can likewise be pledged to facilitate credit 
exchange.  This feature helps to explain why asset poor households, some of which are 
already in debt, are often able to borrow in these villages. Nevertheless, non-credit 
exchange and non-credit sanctions do not justify fixed loan durations.  To explain 
contract duration, we extend a Bulow-Rogoff type model to situations in which the 
borrower’s ability to repay is private information.   
From an incentives perspective, the use of collateral as an enforcement devise is 
effective only when a borrower can take actions, i.e., make payments, to prevent the 
loss of that collateral to a lender.  Thus, the lender should seize collateral only if a 
borrower has outstanding debt and is able to but unwilling to pay.  Analogously, a 
lending household should terminate non-credit exchange with a household that has an 
outstanding loan from it only if that household withholds repayment. This will only be 
feasible when the relationship between the lender and borrower allows the lender to 
monitor the borrower’s ability-to-pay status.  If the lender can, their loan agreement 
will involve non-credit sanctions that are contingent on both the borrower’s outstanding 
debt and his ability to pay.  But, in this case, the informal loan agreement will be open-
  3 ended.  Because the borrower’s promise to repay the loan as soon as possible can be 
monitored and made credible, there is no role for a fixed duration or any other explicit 
time dependency.   
A fixed-duration loan, on the other hand, will be advantageous to parties in 
cases in which a lender cannot observe the borrower’s ability to repay the loan.  The 
fixed duration provides the borrower a window during which non-credit sanctions are 
suspended independent of the amount they owe.  The analogue here is a conventional 
fixed-length loan in which the lender cannot take possession of the borrower’s collateral 
until the end of the loan period.  In effect, a fixed-duration loan is a device for 
postponing non-credit sanctions that an uninformed lender might otherwise impose on a 
borrower who is unable to pay. 
The benefit of a fixed-duration loan is postponed sanctions.  The cost of 
postponing sanctions, however, is an attenuated incentive to repay and hence a smaller 
negotiated loan.  Our data show that fixed-duration loans are indeed smaller than open-
ended loans, but only when the parties live far apart, e.g., in different communities.  
Fixed-duration loans are actually larger when the lender and borrower live in the same 
or nearby village.  Our explanation for this pattern is that the enforcement mechanisms 
available to households depend on where they live.   
Community loan enforcement (Kandori 1992; Grief, 1993,1994; Levin, 2002), 
which entails coordinated collective sanctions that facilitate larger loans, is available 
only to households that reside in the same community.  Central to collective sanctions 
are ongoing household interactions of the sort described above.  Community loan 
enforcement will not necessarily be available for all types of informal loans among 
these households however. In order to coordinate their actions, participants must have 
the same information about the borrower.  But even within a community, an individual 
borrower’s ability to repay need not be widely known and freely available to all of its 
members.  In this situation, we expect community enforcement to be largely limited to 
fixed-duration loans. This is because fixed-duration loans entail sanctions that simply 
depend on the passage of time, and participants other than the lender can more easily 
monitor the passage of time than the borrower’s ability to pay. 
  4 Our formal analysis encompasses two types of contracts (fixed-duration and 
open-ended), two informational environments (the borrower’s ability to pay is public or 
private), and two potentially co-existing enforcement regimes (community and 
personal).
3  Drawing on data from China from the 1930s, we provide empirical 
confirmation for our explanations for contract duration and size, and for the roles of 
personal and community enforcement mechanisms, going beyond the important early 
descriptive work of Grief, Platteau and others.  
We show that the geographical and social proximity of a lender and borrower, 
both of which are a measure of the lender’s direct access to information about the 
borrower, are important predictors of when a contract will be open-ended. 
Instrumenting contract duration choice with select attributes of the household and 
village that capture the differential cost of implementing fixed-duration and open-ended 
loans, we find that geography remains important for enforcement.  When the lender and 
borrower reside in the same community, our econometric model indicates that they can 
negotiate fixed-duration loans that are considerably larger than open-ended loans; 
however, when the loan parties live far apart, they negotiate open-ended loans that are 
at least as large fixed-duration loans.   
For a given enforcement mechanism, our theory explains why open-ended loans 
are at least as large fixed-duration loans; and, for a given loan duration type, our theory 
explains why community enforcement facilitates larger loans than does personal 
enforcement.  Hence, the econometric evidence on duration, loan size and geography is 
consistent with the view that community enforcement is only available to households 
that live near each other and is largely limited to fixed-duration loans.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  In section 1, we describe our 
data and the key observations we want to explain.  We then develop a formal model in 
                                                 
3 When these enforcement mechanisms co-exist, however, a lender’s ability to personally induce a 
borrower to repay a loan by threatening to withdraw future loans is undermined by the availability of an 
alternative community source of credit. Indeed, there are circumstances in which a borrower cannot 
promise credibly to repay a loan enforced by a single lender unless non-credit sanctions are also available 
to that lender.  In other words, we show that non-credit exchange among households may be necessary to 
prevent community loan enforcement from entirely “crowding out” personal loan enforcement in a given 
village. 
  5 sections 2 through 5. In sections 6 and 7, we present our empirical framework and 
results.  Concluding remarks appear in section 8. 
 
1. Data 
            The data we analyze were the product of an intensive household-level survey 
that was carried out in 1936 by the Japanese-installed government of what is now 
northeast China.
4  Every household in 22 geographically and economically separate 
villages was enumerated. Altogether, 1095 households were investigated. The survey 
covers the period from January through December of 1935, and includes data on family 
demographics, farm output, input use, physical and financial assets, incomes and 
expenditures.  Agricultural income, broadly defined to include income from crop sales, 
animal husbandry, farm wages, and land rental, was the source of more than 80 percent 
of all income in these villages, with 95 percent of all households reporting positive 
agricultural income. 
The unique feature of the survey is its detailed information on all credit, labor 
and land agreements involving villagers.  With regard to credit, we have information on 
all credit contracts taken out in 1935, as well as those that were still outstanding as of 
the beginning of 1935. Table 1 reports summary information on the 774 informal credit 
arrangements between households made in 1935. In each case, either the lender or the 
borrower or both resided in one of the 22 surveyed villages; if both, they resided in the 
same village. Altogether, 385 (118) households from these villages borrowed from (lent 
to) another household in 1935.
5   
There are four basic types of informal loans, interest-free loans and three types 
of positive interest rate loans.  The latter group includes pawns, land mortgages, and 
the residual category that we simply label positive interest-rate loans.  Interest-free 
loans did not explicitly impose future obligations on the borrower other than the 
repayment of the principle.  In the case of a land mortgage, on the other hand, interest 
                                                 
4 Northeast China currently includes the provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. 
5 There were also 202 “formal” loans recorded in the survey in which the lender was either a local financial 
institution or “agent” of the government. Over 95 percent of these loans were in only 4 villages, with a 
majority of them in-kind, subsidized grain relief loans. Three of these villages experienced a severe harvest 
shock in 1935. 
  6 was only implicit: “land-use rights” ceded to the lender were in lieu of interest.  Pawns 
and positive interest-rate loans are entirely conventional.   
Within each loan category, we further distinguish between those that have fixed 
durations and those that are open ended.  For each loan type-duration combination, 
Table 1 provides additional information on loan terms, the residency and relationship of 
the borrower and lender, the average loan size and purpose.  We observe loans between 
parties that reside in the same village; in different villages but in the same district; and 
in different districts. A district is a sub-administrative unit of a county that typically 
contained 9-12 villages. 
 
Positive Interest-Rate Loans 
We focus our attention on one type of loan in this paper, the positive interest 
rate loans described in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.  We ignore the land mortgages and 
pawns because non-credit exchange and the reputation of the borrower are not at issue 
in the enforcement of these loans.
6  We exclude the interest-free loans from our analysis 




The positive interest loans were nearly evenly divided between those that were 
open-ended and those that were of fixed duration, typically a year or less in length.  In 
general, the use of physical collateral for these loans was rare. More common was the 
                                                 
6 A pawn is simply an asset sale coupled with a repurchase option.  In the case of the land mortgage, it is 
the reputation of the lender that is at issue as he must be willing to return the land to the borrower once the 
principle has been repaid.   
7 Brandt and Hosios (2003) examines the choice between interest free and positive interest rate loans. 
We argue that in key respects the two kinds of loans are similar, the major difference being in the form of 
the payment of interest. In the case of zero interest loans, in lieu of interest, the lender receives a future 
option on the services of the borrower. The ability of the lender to monitor the borrower’s ability to supply 
these services is critical.  Since the community is at an informational disadvantage concerning the 
economic situation of individual lenders and borrowers, time-contingent loan terms are much more likely to  
be collectively enforced.  And since it cannot be efficient to make these services supplied by the borrower 
to the lender time-contingent (rather than state-contingent), community enforcement of interest-free loans is 
especially unappealing.  
  7 use of a written contract or a third party.
8  However, even in the case of fixed-duration 
loans, these provisions were limited to less than fifteen percent of all contracts.  
Contracting with relatives or with households living in the same district was comparable 
for open-ended and fixed-duration loans.  We also observe relatively modest differences 
between the two kinds of loans in terms of loan purpose. Fixed-duration loans were 
slightly more likely to be used for consumption purposes, while open-ended loans were 
more likely to be used for investment, which includes the costs of education.  
Table 2 reports the distribution of occupations among lenders and borrowers 
participating in positive interest rate loans.  Specialized lenders, including landlords and 
moneylenders, represent a very small part of the pool of lenders.  Most lenders were 
farmers, or were working in agriculture, as were almost all of the borrowers. Also note 
that the occupational distributions for the borrowers and lenders for fixed-duration and 
open-ended loans are very similar.  There is no obvious segmentation. 
  Table 3 provides summary information on average loan size by duration type 
and residency of the borrower and lender. There are three key features to note. First, 
fixed-duration loans between individuals living in the same district are significantly 
larger than open-ended loans. The difference is slightly more than fifty percent. In 
contrast, fixed-duration loans between individuals that do not reside in the same district 
are similar in size to open-ended loans.  Second, open-ended loans between parties 
residing in different districts are larger than open-ended loans between individuals 
residing in the same district.  Finally, the size difference between fixed-duration loans 
involving borrowers and lenders residing in the same and different districts is 
negligible.
9     
Table 4 summarizes overall household borrowing and repayment activity.  Out 
of our sample of 1095 households, 301 had an outstanding loan, defined here as a loan 
                                                 
8 The use of a written contract should not necessarily be associated with court enforcement.  In the absence 
of court enforcement, a written contract may serve as a means of either identifying literate (high human 
capital) borrowers or facilitating inter-household communication concerning defaults. 
9 We later argue that these observations are consistent with the use of community enforcement for fixed-
duration contracts between individuals residing in the same community, and of personal enforcement 
otherwise.   
 
  8 that had not been repaid in full, as of the beginning of 1935. Of these households, 33 or 
10.9 percent had at least one loan in default, i.e., a fixed-duration loan due prior to the 
beginning of 1935 that had not been repaid in full.  In 1935, on the other hand, 390 
households borrowed, including 146 of those who had an outstanding loan as of the 
beginning of 1935.  This implies that slightly less than half of all households with 
outstanding loans as of the beginning of 1935 were able to continue to borrow in 1935, 
including some households with loans in default at the beginning of 1935.  In fact, 
almost half of the households with loans in default borrowed in 1935.  Finally, half of 
all households with outstanding loans made payment on either principle or interest in 
1935.  Although a majority of these households made payment on loans that were not in 
default, defaulting households made payment on 37 loans, 11 of which were in default.  
 
Village (Community) Attributes 
  Our analysis highlights the potential roles of non-credit exchange among 
households and community enforcement in the loan market.  In Table 5, we report 
summary measures related to the “density” of household economic and social 
interactions in the villages in which they live. These include the age of the village, the 
average number of years that households had resided in a village, population density, 
the percentage of households that were members of clans, the percentage of households 
that were autarkic, and a measure of agriculture commercialization.  
On average, and at the time the survey was carried out, several generations of 
households had already lived in the villages we analyze, with the oldest village in our 
sample first settled 350 years earlier. The average number of years that any one 
household had lived in these villages is considerably less, reflecting geographic mobility 
in the region. In the “youngest” of villages, the average number of years was only 10.  
Clan membership, on the other hand, was significant in our sample, with 46 percent of 
all households in a village related to other households in the village through male 
lineage.  There was also considerable heterogeneity across villages, with a high (low) 
of 89.2 (12.0) percent of households in clans.  
  9 Finally, we use two measures to capture the extent of market interaction. First, 
we report the percentage of households in a village that were not involved in either the 
land rental or labor market. The village average was slightly less than 16 percent, but 
in one village more than half of all households were autarkic, while in two other 
villages every household participated in the local land or labor market. To help put 
these numbers in perspective, almost a third of all lend was rented, and more than half 
of all households hired labor either in and out.  Second, we provide estimates of the 
percentage of farm output that was sold by households. On average, slightly less than a 
quarter of all farm output was sold, with a low (high) of 5.6 (50.3) percent. 
 
2. The Model 
  We develop a formal model of informal credit and derive a number of testable 
implications concerning loan size, contract duration, non-credit relationships among 
households, and contract enforcement. Our analysis encompasses two types of contracts 
(fixed-duration and open-ended), two informational environments (the borrower’s ability 
to pay is/is not observable), and two enforcement regimes (community and personal).   In 
this section, we lay out the basic environment. In Section 3, we analyze open-ended 
agreements under both community and personal enforcement. Section 4 does the same 
thing for fixed duration loans. Section 5 then identifies enforcement externalities between 
the two enforcement regimes. 
  Consider a village populated by a finite number of households that engage in 
bilateral credit and non-credit transactions.  Time is discrete.  Each household is 
infinitely lived.  A household’s utility in period t is the sum of its payoffs from the 
various transactions in which it participates in period t.  A household’s lifetime utility 
at the beginning of t is the expected discounted sum of its utilities for periods τ .  
The common discount factor applied between periods is δ .  A household’s 
borrower-lender status is fixed.
t ≥
1 <
10  H denotes the set of households in the village that 
                                                 
10 Our results do not depend on whether a household’s lender-borrower status ever changes between 
periods. 
  10 want to borrower in every period, I denotes the complementary set of households in the 
village that are willing to lend, and L denotes the number of lenders in I.  
Borrower h’s credit history at each point in time describes his past loans from, 
and payments to, each lender in I, and is public information.  As most of the 
agreements in our data set are verbal, we assume that households’ loan transactions are 
observed but not recorded.  In this situation, lenders’ and borrowers’ decisions will 
depend on their expectations regarding other households’ beliefs about what they owe 
each other.
11  A common set of beliefs is imposed following any history of loans and 
payments.    
Loans can be enforced in two ways. If all lenders in I jointly impose sanctions 
on a borrower to induce repayment of an informal loan agreement between that 
borrower and any lender in I, the loan is said to be community enforced.  If a lender 
imposes sanctions on a borrower to induce repayment of its own loan agreement with 
that borrower, while the borrower’s interactions with any other household in I are 
independent of that loan’s status, the loan is said to be a personally enforced loan.  A 
borrower and lender choose the loan enforcement mechanism along with other loan 
terms. 
Each period is divided into three stages or sub-periods (see Figure 1): t , in 
which lenders and borrowers are randomly matched, matched households negotiate loan 
terms and credit is exchanged;  , in which borrowers service their current and 
outstanding loans; and  , in which households engage in non-credit transactions.  




Preferences: The payoff to borrower h  in sub-period t  from receiving a 
loan of size l is  , an increasing, concave function of l satisfying  .  The 
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11 That is, if h believes that all lenders will condition their interactions with him on the belief that he 
owes an amount m to i, h will optimally behave as if he owes m to i, independent of his actual borrowing 
history.  As shown later, these beliefs about households’ debt obligations to one another provide a way to 
punish those lenders who do not follow through with community sanctions.   
  11 strictly increasing, convex function satisfying  .  We assume that there are gains 
from trade, i.e.,  .
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Matching: Households that exchange credit in period t are brought together 
pair-wise by a random matching process.  Let α  denote the probability that borrower 
 and lender i  are matched.  Probability α  is fixed and cannot be influenced 
by either h or i.
H h∈
1 < L α
13  Borrower h may also be matched with a lender outside of I, so that 
.  Unmatched households can neither lend nor borrow during the remaining 
period.
14   
Negotiations: The borrower makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the lender, 
specifying four terms: (i) the size of the loan,  , supplied by the lender to the 
borrower; (ii) the amount that the borrower agrees to repay to the lender,  ; (iii) 
the date when the entire amount owed is due; and (iv) whether community or personal 
enforcement is used.  To simplify, we assume that loan agreements do not entail 
compounding, and so the amount owed remains fixed at r.
0 ≥ r
15   
There are two options regarding the timing of loan payments for a loan supplied 
to a borrower in t :  First, the lender and borrower can negotiate an open-ended loan; 
in this case, the borrower promises to repay the lender in the earliest possible debt-
servicing sub-period τ , τ .  Second, they can negotiate a fixed-duration loan 
lasting, say, n periods; in this case, the borrower is not required to make payments 
before period t+n-1, and promises to repay the lender in the earliest possible debt-
servicing sub-period τ , τ .  1 − n
Debt Payment: Borrower h pays a non-negative amount to lender i in debt 
servicing sub-period  .  Initially, we suppose that h is able to pay any amount owed 
                                                
12 While  can represent either consumption or investment, the ability of household h to repay the loan does 
not depend, as in Atkeson (1991), on the allocation of l between consumption and investment.  
l
13 Allowing households to influence these matching probabilities does not affect our main results. 
14 Allowing two or more sequential matches per period does not change the model’s basic structure, 
especially if C(l)=(1+r)l.  When C(l) is strictly convex, the borrower has to trade off the benefit of a large 
costly loan from a given lender against that of a smaller low-cost loan coupled with continued search for 
other lenders during the same period. 
15 With compounding, the amount owed by a borrower that is unable to service its debt will eventually 
become so large that (absent debt forgiveness) the household would sooner bear the cost of never 
borrowing again to paying the amount owed.   
  12 during a debt-servicing sub-period.  Later, we introduce random wealth constraints, in 
which case the borrower must postpone repayment whenever this constraint binds.    
Non-Credit Exchange: We use non-credit exchange to describe any economic 
and social interaction between households that does not involve credit.  Non-credit 
exchanges occur in sub-period  .  Unlike credit exchange, matching for non-credit 
purposes is neither random nor exclusive; each household has non-credit exchanges 
with the same set of households every period.  A household’s total payoff from non-
credit exchange in   is the sum of the individual payoffs from non-credit exchange 
with all other households. 
3 t
3 t
While non-credit exchange between pairs of households can be extensive and 
varied, we limit attention to exchanges that can be made contingent on a borrower’s 
credit status.  For any borrower h  and lender i , these non-credit exchanges 
are represented by the outcomes of the two-player simultaneous-move game, denoted 
by G and depicted in normal form in Figure 2.  In this game, {  choose actions from 
the set  , where E stands for “exchange” and DE stands for “don’t exchange.”  
The fixed benefit to h of non-credit exchange with i is  .  A transaction cost, 
, is borne by a household when its efforts to exchange are unsuccessful. 








The non-credit exchange modeled by G represents transactions between 
borrower h and lender i that are much more beneficial for the borrower than the lender.  
The rationale for focusing on asymmetric non-credit exchanges is straightforward.  
Borrower h can negotiate better terms from lender i when i can credibly commit to 
impose non-credit sanctions on h when h is delinquent.  However, i will be less likely 
to impose sanctions if they are costly for i as well.  It follows that h and i have a joint 
interest in placing at risk those non-credit exchanges that are most (least) beneficial to 
the borrower (lender).  Setting the lender’s gain to zero in G is a simple way to capture 
this effect without having to model explicitly how the non-credit exchanges at risk for 
any borrower-lender pair are determined. 
 
3. Open-Ended Agreements  
  13   In this section, we describe informal loan agreements that do not have fixed 
durations.  These self-enforcing agreements are equilibrium strategies in a dynamic 
game between households.  Our model has multiple equilibria.  We restrict attention 
here to the equilibrium that maximizes households’ joint surplus.  This equilibrium also 
has outcomes that are broadly consistent with the household behavior that we 
documented earlier in section 1 concerning loan duration choice, ongoing borrowing by 
households in debt, and loan repayment. 
  Our goal is to develop a model of a village economy in which alternative loan 
enforcement mechanisms co-exist.  In this situation, a household’s outstanding 
obligations and current credit needs determine whether it negotiates a loan that relies on 
community or personal enforcement.  We begin in this section by describing two 
benchmark situations, one in which only community loan enforcement is available and 
one in which only personal loan enforcement is available.  In both scenarios, the other 
type of enforcement is unavailable only in the sense that households adopt strategies 
that support its non-cooperative outcome.
16 
  
A. Community Enforcement   
The amount that borrower h owes to lender i is the sum of h’s obligations to i 
resulting from all prior loans supplied by i to h, less all payments concerning those 
loans made by h to i.  The total amount that h owes to all households in I at the 
beginning of sub-period t  is denoted by  , or   for short, and is simply the 
sum of the amounts owed to each  .  With community loan enforcement, 
households’ strategies depend on the outstanding obligations of individual households to 
the entire community.  Specifically, borrower h’s offer to lender i, and i’s acceptance 
strategy, depend on  ; h’s repayment strategy depends on  ; and the non-credit 
decision rules employed by households {  depend on m . 
z ) (t m
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16 In the version with community (personal) enforcement, lenders refuse to supply loans that rely on 
personal (community) enforcement, borrowers refuse to service loans that rely on personal (community) 
enforcement, and non-credit exchange is independent of any personal (community) loan obligations. 
  14 With respect to debt payment, we determine a critical aggregate debt value,  , 
such that borrower h will pay m  in total to all lenders in I if and only if  .  
With respect to credit supply, we determine a second critical aggregate debt value, 
, such that lender i will accept a loan proposal from h only if h’s total current 
obligation to lenders in I does not exceed  .  When   and h owes  , h 
is said to have a community line of credit with I that enables it to continue to borrow 
while carrying forward outstanding debt from one period to the next; once  , 
however, this line of credit is exhausted and new loans will be withheld until the 
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    In Appendix A, we determine values of {  that support a sub-game 
perfect equilibrium in which households use the following decision rules:  First, when 
borrower h and lender i are matched in t , h offers i the contract that solves 
} ,
* * * m m
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where m  is the amount that h owes to all lenders in I when h meets i in t ; h’s 
remaining debt capacity with I, m , is the largest additional payment obligation 
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17  Next, after offers have been made in  , lender i accepts 
an open-ended loan offer from borrower h,  , if and only if two conditions are 
met: the aggregate amount that h owes to I is not too large, i.e.,  , and i’s 
anticipated payoff from offer {  is no less than its no-exchange alternative.  Third, 
when borrower h owes   to households in I at the beginning of debt-servicing sub-
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17 The payoff function V  in (1) is an increasing, concave function on the initial debt-capacity interval 
[0, ], where   and l  is the efficient loan size satisfying  ; V is constant when 
 and there is sufficient debt capacity to allow the borrower to negotiate an additional 
efficient-sized loan.  Also, V . 
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  15 pays zero otherwise.  Finally, when h owes   to I at the beginning of sub-period  , 
households h and i employ the same strategy in their non-credit game, G, choosing E 
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  The equilibrium values of {  must be such that, when all parties follow 
their equilibrium strategies, h prefers to pay any   to lenders in I during   
rather than postpone payment (in whole or part) to t+1. As shown in Appendix A,  , 
the maximum amount which h can credibly promise to pay lenders in I, satisfies 
} ,
* * * m m
* 2 m mhI ≤
2 t
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The left hand side of (2a) is the benefit of paying   immediately, i.e., the value 
of ongoing non-credit exchange,  , plus the expected discounted value of borrowing 
from I, starting debt free, δα .  The right hand side is the present discounted 
value of postponing payment by one period.  The solution to (2a) is depicted in Figure 3.  
As expected, the maximum total amount that h will pay to lenders in I is an increasing 
function of: (i) the benefit to h of non-credit exchange with the households in I,  ; (ii) 
the likelihood that in any future period h will again be matched with a household in I, 
; and (iii) the marginal benefit for h of a small loan, V .
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18   
  There is a range of possible equilibrium lines of credit, starting with zero, that 
household h can have with I.  However, h’s preferred line of credit with I is the one that 
maximizes the amount of debt,  , that h can credibly carry before receiving his last 
loan, (after which credit sanctions are imposed); given  , we show that this maximal 
value for   satisfies   δα  and 
* * m
* m
* * m () ≥ −δ 1 ( '
* m LV −
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18It follows that   if either (i) non-credit sanctions are available,  , or (ii) collective credit 
sanctions alone are sufficient to induce repayment, i.e., δα ; alternatively, m  if 
 and δα . 
0
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  16  
where V  is the payoff from the optimal loan provided to a borrower with 
outstanding debt  ; in this case, the benefit of paying immediately   is 
the value of non-credit exchange, as before, plus the differential expected discounted 
gain from borrowing debt free, V , and borrowing with outstanding debt  , 
.  Using the definition of   in (2a), this simplifies to 
) (
* * * m m −
* m
)
* * m −
* * * * 2 m m mhI < =
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  Figure 3a uses (2a) and (2b) to depict a situation where  .  In these 
circumstances, h is willing to pay any aggregate obligation to households in I not 
exceeding  , and can continue to borrow from them until his total accumulated debt 
exceeds  .  Figure 3b depicts a situation where   and δα , so 
that  .  As non-credit exchange is absent in this case (or, at least, cannot be 
made debt-contingent), a conventional self-enforcing credit agreement results in which 
h can borrow from   only if its total outstanding debt with I is zero.  Finally, 
Figure 3c depicts a situation where δα , so that   (=0) 
when   (=0).  This is the case highlighted by Bulow and Rogoff (1989), whence 
maintaining non-credit exchange is so important for h that households in I can allow h 
to continue to borrow until its debt equals  .  
* * * 0 m m < <
( − > 1 ) 0 (
' LV
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  To complete this description of equilibrium play, we need to explain why it is in 
the interest of individual lenders to participate in the collective punishment of a 
delinquent borrower.  Specifically, we need to describe how a lender is made worse off 
by supplying a loan to a borrower whose community-enforced debt exceeds  .  As 
loan transactions are observable, several alternative punishment schemes are available.  
One especially Draconian option is to punish innocent households along with the guilty 
lender (Kandori, 1992).  That is, if i gives h a loan when h’s community-enforced debt 
exceeds  , households then adopt non-cooperative sub-game perfect equilibrium 
* * m
* * m
  17 strategies in which all borrowers default on all of their current and future loans 
(including i’s most recent loan to h) and lenders no longer supply loans to borrowers.  
This works, but seems extreme.  We consider an alternative situation in which 
community members insulate themselves from the consequences of a defection by any 
one lender who lifts its credit sanctions, and so costs are imposed (if at all) only on the 
deviant lender. 
  A given loan will be community enforced only if community members recognize 
it as such.  The community-enforced label attached to a loan requires consensus.  We 
assume that households withhold this label from any loans supplied to a borrower who 
has already exhausted his community line of credit.  That is, once borrower h’s 
community-enforced debt exceeds  , all parties assume that any new loan from i to h 
will be enforced by i alone.  Of course, assigning a personally-enforced label to new 
loans leaves the borrower’s community-enforced obligation unchanged (so that 
), and so the remaining lenders are unaffected.  In these circumstances, i will 
lend to h only if i alone can credibly threaten actions that induce payment by h. 
* * m
1 2
hI hI m m =
 
B. Ability-to-Pay Contingent Exchange 
  We observed earlier that many households in our sample had outstanding debt 
while negotiating new loans.  Households carried debt over time and, in some cases, did 
so for many years while continuing to borrow.  Along our model’s equilibrium path, 
however, households begin every period debt free.  Households that borrow in t  repay 
the entire amount owed in t  and so begin period t+1 without any debt.  Borrowers are 




  Our model can be adapted easily to describe situations in which borrowers face 
random wealth constraints that preclude loan repayment.
19  With randomly-binding 
                                                 
19 Wealth shocks are the consequence of resource-absorbing disturbances, such as family illnesses, 
unanticipated ceremonies (weddings, funerals), and adverse production conditions.  Allowing these 
shocks to be serially correlated, and relaxing the assumption that ability-to-pay is a zero-one variable, 
complicates the analysis and notation (as credit priority becomes important) but does not change the basic 
results. 
  18 wealth constraints, non-credit exchange will be contingent on (i) a borrower’s 
outstanding debt and (ii) its ability to pay.  Households {h,i} choose DE when h has debt 
and is able but unwilling to pay, and choose E otherwise.  This is efficient because there 
is no incentive reason to punish borrowers who are willing but unable to pay.  
Households then carry open-ended debt from period t to t+1, in equilibrium, whenever 
they are unable to service their loans in t .  As determined earlier, a household with 
outstanding open-ended debt can continue to borrow as long as its line of credit with I has 
not been exhausted.  Beyond generating positive debt levels in equilibrium, the model 
with randomly-binding wealth constraints is essentially the same as the one without 
these constraints. 
2
  In this version of the model, there is symmetric information concerning 
borrowers’ wealth constraints because lenders can directly observe whether or not any 
particular borrower is able to pay during each debt-servicing sub-period.  As a result, 
non-credit exchange can be contingent on a borrower’s ability-to-pay.  Later, we 
consider situations where ability-to-pay is private information. 
    
C. Personal Enforcement
20  
  A loan is personally enforced when a single lender imposes credit and non-credit 
sanctions on a borrower, contingent only on the amount that the borrower owes to the 
lender.  An informal loan between borrower h and lender i that relies on personal loan 
enforcement involves the same strategies introduced earlier, except that the set of 
lenders I is replaced by a single lender i (L=1). 
 We  replace  m with w to distinguish the obligations of personally enforced loans:  
If h and i are matched in t , h offers i the loan contract giving payoff V ; i 
accepts the offer if and only if that amount h owes satisfies   and i expects to 
be repaid; h pays   to i in   if w , and pays zero otherwise; lastly, h and i 
1 ) (
1 *
hi w w −




* 2 w hi ≤
                                                 
20 This subsection describes the benchmark equilibrium with personal loan enforcement in which 
community enforced loans are neither given nor repaid. 
  19 both play E in   if and only if  .  Substituting L=1 into (2) allows us to solve 
for { : 
3 t 0
3 = hi w
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where () .  Diagrams depicting the determination of   and   
look essentially the same as those in Figure 3 and have the same interpretations, but 
expressed in terms of personal rather than community-wide credit and non-credit 
sanctions. 
) (
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D. Comparing Personal and Community Enforcement 
  In personal and community enforcement regimes alike, the maximum debt that a 
borrower can carry increases with the sanctions that an individual lender or group of 
lenders can impose.  The standard intuition is that group sanctions are more severe.  In 
the present model, with  , credit sanctions are indeed more severe because α  
is larger and steeper than α  for any , and non-credit sanctions are also more 
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21   We have: 
 
RESULT 1: As community enforcement generally imposes larger credit and non-credit 
costs on a delinquent borrower than does personal loan enforcement, a borrower can 
promise credibly to pay more towards a community enforced loan than a personally 
enforced loan, and can thereby secure a larger loan in the first place.  Further, 
borrowers having larger socio-economic networks, which imply the prospect of enhanced 
collective sanctions, can negotiate larger community- enforced loans with any given 
lender; these same networks do not influence the size of any personally enforced loans.  
                                                 
)
21Non-credit sanctions with community-enforced loans need not be larger.  Suppose that an entirely 
different set of non-credit transactions is contingent on personal debt, with benefit   for borrower h.  
Then, the personal non-credit sanction is more severe if ∆ .  On the other hand, if the same amount 
of non-credit exchange is withdrawn for any debt, community sanctions are more severe as 
< . 
h ∆
L h ∆ >
h ∆ 1 ( − ∆ + ∆ L h
  20 In both regimes, non-credit exchange allows borrowers with outstanding debt to continue 
to borrow until their line of credit is exhausted.   
 
We observed earlier in Section 1 that households in debt may continue to borrow; we 
empirically examine the remaining parts of Result 1 in Section 7. 
 
4. Fixed-Duration Agreements 
  A borrower is said to default on a loan agreement if that agreement ends and the 
borrower has not repaid the loan in full.  Accordingly, default is a state that is specific to 
loan agreements with fixed durations.  In this section, we extend our basic model to 
explain why lenders and borrowers may negotiate loans with fixed durations, why lenders 
continue to supply loans to households with outstanding loans in default, and why 
borrowers continue to service these loans.  While our analysis applies in both 
enforcement regimes, we only consider the case of community enforcement.  Personal 
enforcement can again be viewed as a special case.    
 W hen a lender and borrower negotiate an open-ended loan in  , the borrower 
promises to pay the lender in the earliest possible debt-servicing sub-period τ , τ .  
An open-ended loan involves non-credit sanctions that are contingent on the amount 
owed and the borrower’s ability to pay when ability-to-pay is observable; otherwise, 
these sanctions are contingent only on the amount owed.  When a lender and borrower 
negotiate a fixed-duration loan lasting n periods, however, the borrower is not required 
to make payments before period t+n-1.  By “not required,” we mean that payment is 
not required to avoid non-credit sanctions during the first n-1 periods of the loan.   
1 t
2 t ≥
  The distinguishing feature of a fixed-duration loan is that it allows non-credit 
sanctions to be postponed.  In consequence, households’ decision rules must be 
modified.  Specifically, independent of the amount that h owes, h and each i  play E 
in G as long as h has not defaulted; then, if a loan has not been repaid come its final 
period, the parties revert to the open-ended loan strategies that impose non-credit 
I ∈
  21 sanctions on the borrower contingent on the amount owed and the borrower’s ability to 
pay (if the latter information is available).
22   
  Households may prefer to negotiate a fixed-duration loan only in circumstances 
in which postponing non-credit sanctions is beneficial, that is, when they would 
otherwise forgo non-credit exchange along the equilibrium path of the game.  These 
circumstances are described below:  
 
RESULT 2: Borrower h and lender  will negotiate a fixed-duration loan only if:  (i) 
h’s wealth constraint randomly binds, i.e., h is occasionally unable to service its debts; 
(ii) the status of h’s wealth constraint in any period is privately known to h, i.e., 
lenders cannot tell whether h is able to pay; and (iii) h has non-credit relationships with 
lenders in I. 
I i∈
 
  The explanation for Result 2 is straightforward.  With symmetric information, 
the parties can negotiate open-ended loans with decision rules that make non-credit 
exchange contingent on a borrower’s ability to pay (i.e., each party plays E when either 
debt is zero or the borrower is unable to pay).  In this case, the borrower’s repayment 
incentive constraint is relevant only in those states in which the borrower is able to pay, 
and so a borrower who is able to pay its debts will do so in equilibrium.  With 
symmetric information, households do not forgo non-credit exchange in equilibrium, 
and so there is no need to negotiate a fixed-duration loan to postpone sanctions. 
  With asymmetric information concerning the borrower’s ability to service its 
debt, open-ended loans admit two possibilities:  In one case, non-credit exchange is 
independent of a borrower’s credit situation and always occurs, which is equivalent to 
setting  ; this implies that   and that households in debt are unable to 
borrow, which is counterfactual, and rules out any role for fixed-duration loans.  The 
other possibility is that non-credit exchange occurs if and only if h has no obligations to 
I.  In this case, non-credit exchange is withdrawn when the borrower fails to make a 
0 = ∆ 0
* * * * = = w m
                                                 
22That is, for a given amount of debt, the sub-game beginning with the debt-servicing sub-period of the 
final period of a fixed-duration loan is indistinguishable from the sub-game beginning with the first debt-
servicing sub-period of an open-ended loan.  
  22 promised payment, and so households forgo non-credit exchange with positive 
probability in equilibrium.  In this case, postponing non-credit sanctions via a fixed-
duration agreement can be beneficial. 
  Absent non-credit exchange between the parties and, hence, absent non-credit 
sanctions, there is nothing to postpone.  As a result, the decision rules employed during 
the k-th interim period of an n-period loan,  , are identical to those employed 
during the k-th period of an open-ended loan.  Since the borrower’s incentive to pay is 
the same in every period following the negotiation of either loan, the borrower will 
repay the loan as soon as possible in both situations.  Fixed loan duration is of no 
consequence in this case. 
n k ≤
 
A. Duration and Loan Size 
  We illustrate the benefit-cost calculation determining contract duration with a 
simple example.  Suppose that there is a positive probability that borrower h is unable 
to service its debt in one and only one period, t.  That is, h’s wealth constraint binds 
with probability  >0 in t  and, in subsequent debt-servicing sub-periods, h is able to 
pay any amount owed.  The lenders in I cannot determine whether h’s wealth constraint 
is binding in t .  Since periods τ  are characterized by symmetric information and 
non-bonding wealth constraints, h will be debt free at the beginning of period t.  To 
simplify further, we initially suppose that h will never again borrow from I, i.e., α  





I i∈ 1 + ≥ t
 Suppose  that  h is matched with i  at the beginning of period t.  The absence 
of future credit transactions with I has two implications for fixed-duration loans:  First, 
since the borrower’s incentive to pay a given amount in the final period of a fixed-
duration loan is the same as in the first period of an open-ended loan, we know from 
(2a) that the maximum amount that h can promise credibly to pay in the final period of 
any fixed-duration loan is  .  Second, the maximum amount that h can 
promise credibly to pay prior to the final period of a fixed duration loan is zero; there 
is no incentive to pay because, on one hand, non-credit sanctions are postponed to the 
I ∈
) ( δ − ∆ 1 / L
  23 end of the loan and, on the other hand, there is no further possibility of credit exchange 
with lenders from I. 
  In this setting, where a borrower’s ability to pay in t is private information, 
households negotiate either an open-ended loan or an n-period fixed-duration loan, 
; a 1-period fixed-duration loan and an open-ended loan are identical.  Letting V  
denote the payoff from an n-period loan, and defining  , we have 
2 ≥ n
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where l  denotes the corresponding optimal loan size.  Since  V  for  , the 
choice is between an open-ended loan and a 2-period fixed-duration loan with payoffs 
 and V , respectively. 
j 2 n V ≥ 3 ≥ n
1 V
2
  When the enforcement constraints in both problems do not bind,  , and (4) 
implies that a 2-period loan dominates because of the benefit of postponing non-credit 
sanctions.  Since  , the enforcement constraint binds first for relatively small 
fixed-duration loans.  Thus, when one or both enforcement constraints are binding, we 
have l .  In this case, the open-ended loan is preferred if the benefit of a larger 
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  24   These results do not depend on whether or not h can continue to borrow from 
households in I after period t.  This is because, for any pattern of equilibrium interim 
and final payments, the joint payoffs are again given by (4).
23  As a result, we have:  
 
RESULT 3a: For any borrower and set of lenders, and a given enforcement regime, 
open-ended loans are at least as large as fixed-duration loans.
24 
 
While this result holds whether or not the borrower’s ability to pay is private 
information, a fixed-duration loan will be negotiated only if it is private.  In some 
circumstances, moreover, private information is sufficient for fixed-duration loans.  
From the definitions of V  and V , we have: 
1 n
 
RESULT 3b: There is a   such that if the borrower’s ability to pay is private 
information and the probability his wealth constraint binds exceeds q*, then, a fixed-
duration loan will be optimal. 
) 1 , 0 ( *∈ q
 
As an empirical matter, the latter result indicates that fixed-duration loans will likely 
dominate with private information because the circumstances that necessitate borrowing 
in the first place are likely to be auto-correlated.  In other words, q will likely be close 
to one in the initial periods after a loan has been negotiated, and so the benefit of 
postponing (almost certain) non-credit sanctions exceeds the possible cost of a smaller 
loan. 
 
5. Personal and Community Enforcement Externalities 
                                                 
23 If h can continue to borrow, we need only replace   with  , and introduce the incentive 
constraints for interim payments made during the course of a 2-period loan.   
()
1 1
− − ∆ δ L
* w
24 This result holds whether or not the borrower’s ability to pay is observable.  That is, asymmetric 
information only lowers V  by q  but does not otherwise affect {V ,V } or { ,l }.  In turn, this 
shows that open-ended loans dominate with symmetric information, because V + >V  when  ≥  , 
and that fixed-duration loans necessarily reflect costly ability-to-pay information. 
1 L ∆
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  25   The empirical portions of this paper provide evidence that lenders and 
borrowers who reside close to each other choose between personal and community loan 
enforcement.  As in Section 3 of this paper, previous research compares outcomes with 
one mechanism to those with the other (Grief, 1994; Levin, 2002), but fails to consider 
situations in which both are available.  In this section, we briefly describe a setting in 
which these two mechanisms co-exist.  As a byproduct, we identify a negative 
externality among self-enforcing agreements, whereby the availability of loans using 
one type of mechanism undermines the credible payment promises that can be made 
with the other one.  
  Consider a situation in which wealth constraints never bind, and so matched 
households negotiate open-ended loans.  Suppose that for each borrower-lender pair, 
, there is a pair of identical but separate non-credit coordination games:  The 
strategies in one coordination game are contingent on h’s current total obligations to 
households in I as a consequence of past loans to h that are collectively enforced by all 
households in I; the strategies in the other game are contingent on h’s current 
obligations to i as a consequence of past loans to h from i that are enforced by i 
alone.   
{ i h, }
  We aim to determine values for { }
* * *,m m  and { }   ,
* * * w w
() δ − 1
that support an 
equilibrium in which open-ended loans may alternatively be individually or collectively 
enforced.  To simplify, we suppose that δα , which implies that 
 for each i .  In these circumstances, as depicted in Figure 3c, credit 
sanctions alone are insufficient to induce borrowers to repay their loans.  Hence, 
, and  .  As shown in the appendix, there exists an equilibrium with 
both community and personal loan enforcement in which 
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  26 Accordingly, if h owes m to I as a consequence of past community-enforced loans and 
owes w to each   as a consequence of past personally enforced loans, then, h 
prefers to pay m+wL in the current period rather than postpone any payment whenever 
 and  . 
I i∈
* w ≤
* m m ≤ w
  The intuition behind (5) and (6) is straightforward.  Consider (5) first.  Suppose 
that   owes w to i in t  and has no outstanding community-enforced loans, m=0.  If h 
meets i in the following period, they will negotiate a community-enforced loan, 
independent of whether or not   paid anything to i in t .  This is because borrower h 
has a larger line of credit with the community as a whole than with any individual 
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25   As a result, the only benefit for   of paying w to i in t  is the non-
credit gain,  ; the benefit of postponing payment to t+1 is ( .  The maximum 
amount that h will pay on a personally enforced loan therefore satisfies (5).  The 
availability of larger community-enforced loans reduces (and in this particular case 
eliminates) the impact of any personal credit sanctions.  As a result, personal non-credit 
sanctions are critical for maintaining the viability of personal loans.  
h
∆
  Now, consider (6).  A household that has drawn down its community line of 
credit can always switch to personal loans.  Suppose that   has no outstanding personal 
loans in   but owes m to I, where m satisfies V .  If m is left unpaid, 
h and i will negotiate a personal loan if they meet in t+1.  The left-hand-side of (6) 
describes the benefit for h of paying m to I in  , and has two terms; the non-credit 
gain, ∆ , plus the benefit of being able to access community-enforced loans again in 
the following period.  With personal loans as a fallback option, the benefit of accessing 
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25 To establish that  , note that 
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  27 these loans.  As a result, the maximum amount that h will pay to I is smaller than what 
h would pay if personal loans are entirely unavailable to h, as described by (2a).   
  Together (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) give 
 
RESULT 4: When the loan enforcement mechanism is a choice variable, the repayment 
promises that are credible with each mechanism are reduced, i.e., the largest 
community and personal credit obligations,   and  , have smaller values than in 




6. An Empirical Framework 
  For each household in our sample that borrowed during 1935, we observe the 
duration type and size of each of its loans but do not have direct information on a loan’s 
enforcement mechanism. On the other hand, for each loan we know if the lender resides 
in the same village as the borrower, in the same district but in a different village, or in a 
different district.  Since these villages are typically very small (50 households, on 
average) and are often located within several kilometers of 10-15 other villages, the 
distinction between a lender that lives in the same village as a borrower or in an adjacent 
or nearby village, i.e., in the same district, is of a second-order.  Below, we explain how 
this information on the residency of the two parties can be used to develop testable 
predictions concerning their choice of duration and loan enforcement type across space.  
In our empirical analysis, we will distinguish lender-borrower pairs in which both parties 
reside in the same district from those in which they reside in different districts. 
   In our theoretical model, there is a range of contract terms available to a given 
lender and borrower. Their loan agreement can be open-ended or have a fixed duration; 
be enforced with personal or community sanctions; and have sanctions made contingent 
on the borrower’s ability-to-repay (should the lender choose to acquire this information).   
This provides a total of eight contractual possibilities.  In addition, the borrower must 
decide to borrow locally or to look outside his community for credit.   The borrower’s 
payoffs from these different choices are given as follows: Let V  and V  








  28 (FD) and open-ended (OE) loans, respectively, when there is symmetric (S) information 
concerning the borrower’s ability to pay and there are   households in addition to the 
lender who participate in loan enforcement.  Similarly, let V  and V  denote 
the corresponding payoffs when there is asymmetric (A) information concerning the 
borrower’s ability to pay.  The respective payoffs with personal (P) enforcement, 
, are each equal to their community-enforced counterpart when 
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  The total number of contractual alternatives available to borrowers and lenders, 
and which we much consider empirically, is significantly less than eight.  First, our 
theoretical model implies that with symmetric information, an open-ended loan is always 
preferred to a fixed-duration loan; in other words, where feasible, income-contingent 
loans dominate time-contingent loans.  This gives V  and V , 






  Second, we showed that asymmetric information between the loan parties is a 
necessary condition for the parties to prefer a fixed-duration loan.  With asymmetric 
information, a fixed-duration loan is preferred to an open-ended loan when the benefit of 
postponing non-credit sanctions exceeds the possible cost of a smaller loan.  This will be 
the case, according to Result 3b, when a household’s income (or wealth) is highly auto-
correlated.
 26  As this is a common feature of economic life in remote rural villages, we 
adopt:     
 
ASSUMPTION 1: Fixed-duration loans are negotiated whenever there is asymmetric 
information between the lender and the borrower regarding the borrower’s ability to 
repay.  
 
Assumption 1 implies that V  for all n and V , so that the total 












26 When a household’s income (wealth) exhibits a high degree of auto-correlation, they are unlikely to be 
able to repay in the initial periods following a loan.  If the lender is asymmetrically informed about the 
ability of the borrower to repay the loan, non-credit sanctions will be immediately imposed. Thus, from the 
perspective of the borrower, the benefit of postponing these sanctions swamps other considerations.  With 
symmetric information, autocorrelation is not an issue.   
  29 asymmetric information and either personal or community enforcement; and open-ended 
loans with symmetric information and either personal or community enforcement. 
  A community enforced loan can then be either open-ended with symmetric 
information or have a fixed duration with asymmetric information.  Central to this choice 
is the determination of n, the number of participants in community enforcement.   An 
open-ended loan requires that information on the borrower’s ability to pay be available to 
all participating households.  For many and perhaps most participating households, this 
information is costly to acquire, either directly or from an informed lender.  Moreover, 
the total cost is likely to be substantial because a borrower’s ability-to-pay changes from 
period to period and, hence, must be monitored and communicated on an ongoing basis.  
  We assume that the number of participants in an open-ended loan is found by 
maximizing the borrower’s payoff, net of the monitoring, communication and 
coordination costs borne by the lender: 
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Here, C  is the cost borne by the lender to monitor the borrower’s ability to pay and 
, with c>0, is the lender’s cost of communicating this information to, and 
coordinating with the other   participants in loan enforcement; C  is also borne with 
personal enforcement (n=1).  By comparison, a community-enforced fixed-duration loan 
only requires that the lender and other households involved in enforcement monitor the 
passage of time.  A fixed-duration loan thereby reduces the costs of information 
acquisition and exchange as the lender forgoes monitoring and interacts less frequently 
with the other participants.  The corresponding problem is: 
P
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where   is the cost of the lender’s communication-coordination activities and 
d>0.    
2 ) 1 ( − n d
  It seems likely that d<c, simply because fixed-duration loans involve fewer 
contingencies.  The relevant empirical question is how d and c vary with the distance 
between where the lender and borrower reside. 
  30  
A. When Households Live Far Apart (Out-of-District) 
  When the contracting parties live relatively far apart, e.g., in different districts, the 
lender's market and non-market activities will not usually involve members of the 
borrower's community.  Similarly, the borrower's activities will be independent of the 
lender's circle.  In these circumstances, community loan enforcement is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible.
27  These observations suggest the following: 
 
ASSUMPTION 2: When lenders and borrowers reside in different districts, the 
communication-coordination costs of loan enforcement, {c,d}, are large enough that all 
loans between them  must rely on personal loan enforcement.
28 
 
Hence, out-of-district loan choice is simple: all loans are enforced personally by the 
lender, and have a fixed-duration if V  and are open-ended otherwise.  
  Three testable implications follow from this assumption and our model when 
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      (a)  The size of the optimal fixed-duration loan between two households residing in 
different districts will not exceed the optimal open-ended loan they could also 
negotiate;  
      (b)  A borrower’s social network, which is relevant only for community enforcement, 
will not influence the terms of its loans with lenders in other districts; 
(c) Households that reside in different districts are more likely to negotiate open-
ended loans when they are related or acquainted than when they are unacquainted.  
 
                                                 
27McMillan and Woodruff (1999) make a similar geographic argument for the absence of community sanctions 
in the case of self-enforcing agreements between domestic suppliers in Vietnam and foreign customers. The 
presumption here is that members of the community in which a borrower resides do not participate in the 
collective enforcement of a loan secured from a lender who resides geographically, economically and 
socially outside of that community (see Grief, 1994). 
28 That is, as c and d become large, the optimal value of n in each of the above problems converges to the 
corner solution n=1, which is the case of personal enforcement. 
  31   Regarding (c), a key determinant of a loan’s duration type is the cost, C , of 
monitoring the borrower’s ability to pay.  When this monitoring cost is small, as might be 
the case when the parties are related or interact frequently (even when they live far apart), 
we expect the parties to negotiate a personally enforced loan that is open ended.  When 
the lender’s monitoring costs are substantial enough that V , it will be 
more efficient to forgo monitoring, remain uninformed and negotiate a (possibly smaller) 
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B. When Households Live Nearby (In-District) 
  Assumption 2 implies that community enforcement is only available to parties 
that live near each other.  While our contract data are rich in many dimensions, we cannot 
tell how a loan is enforced.  That is, among in-district fixed-duration loans, the 
presumption is that they involve both personal and community enforcement, and likewise 
for in-district open-ended loans.   
  Our model explains why, with personal enforcement, fixed-duration loans are 
smaller than open-ended loans. The argument also holds for community enforced loans, 
as long as the number of participants n is the same, or nearly so, for both types of loans.  
Thus, if we observe that in-district, fixed-duration loans are no larger than open-ended 
loans, we could not reject the hypothesis that all in-district loans rely on personal 
enforcement, as do all out-of-district loans.  On the other hand, if we observe that fixed-
duration in-district loans are strictly larger, we would then conclude that there must be 
some community enforcement of in-district fixed-duration loans. On average, the larger 
size obtains because either the proportion of fixed-duration loans that are community 
enforced exceeds the proportion of open-ended loans that are community enforced or, 
with comparable proportions, the number of participants, n, in any community-enforced 
open-ended loans is smaller, so that the resulting loan is also smaller.
29 
                                                 
29 Community enforcement requires that information about the borrower be shared among n participants, 
which is costly.  Moreover, these costs will be larger when the information is more complex and is 
collected and disseminated more frequently.  As a result, the communication-coordination costs of open-
ended loans likely exceed those of fixed-duration loans.  That is, open-ended loans require ongoing 
acquisition and exchange of ability-to-pay information about the borrower, while fixed-duration loans only 
require that the passage of time be monitored and communicated.  A case can then be made that c>d and 
that c is relatively large, which implies that the number of households participating in community 
  32   From Table 4, we know that in-district, fixed-duration loans are in fact on average 
larger than open-ended loans. In a regression context, we will test to see if: 
 
      (d) The size of the optimal fixed-duration loan between households residing in the 
same district exceeds the size of the optimal open-ended loan they could 
otherwise negotiate. 
      (e) The borrower’s socio-economic network influences his choice between fixed-
duration and open-ended loans when the borrower and lender reside in the same 
district. 
 
These two propositions will hold only if some of the fixed-duration loans rely on 
community enforcement. Evidence rejecting either proposition casts doubt on the 
importance of this enforcement mechanism.  
  The third testable implication regarding loans between households that live near 
each other is: 
     
      (f)  Households that are related will be no more likely than unrelated households to 
negotiate open-ended loans when they reside in the same district. 
 
That is, as households residing in the same or nearby village generally know each other, 
we expect that being related will not confer the same informational advantage that it 
would if the parties lived far apart.   
  
 
7. Empirical Implementation 
   In order to test predictions (a)-(f), we formulate a standard switching-regression 
model (Maddala, 1983).  There are two enforcement-cum-geographic regimes, the in-
district regime and the out-of-district regime.  According to Assumption 2, loan 
                                                                                                                                                 
enforcement of open-ended loans is considerably smaller than the number participating in community 
enforcement of fixed-duration loans. Indeed, if c is large enough, a corner solution results in which all 
open-ended loans are personally enforced, as in the case of out-of-district loans. 
  33 agreements may be enforced in-district with either community or personal sanctions, but 
are enforced exclusively with personal sanctions out-of-district.  The empirical model is 
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where Size is the size of household h’s loan, X h
Dur
h is a set of household variables affecting 
loan size,  =1 if the loan has a fixed duration and is zero otherwise, Y h h is set of 
household determinants of duration choice, SEN  measures the extent of h’s social and 
economic network in its village, and   measures the cost of making ability-to-pay 
information available to the lender. 
h
h AI
  A criterion function, γ , determines if the borrower contracts with a lender 
residing in the same district as the borrower or outside.  Each regime has an equation 
describing the loan size and the probability of negotiating a fixed-duration loan; a linear 
probability model is used in the latter case.  We correct the equations in each regime for 
potential selection effects related to the decision to contract either inside or outside the 
district, and correct the loan-size equations in each regime for endogeneity of the duration 
decision using two-stage least squares.
h h Z ε − '
30 
    In light of predictions (a) through (f), the empirical implications of our model are: 
 
Out-of-District                In-District            
(a)  ,   (d) β ,  0 2 Out, ≤ β 0 2 In, >
(b) 0,               (e)  0,  ≈ 4 Out, β > 4 In, β
(c)  >0,   (f) In, β 0.  5 Out, β ≈ 5
  
 
30 We also estimated the model without corrections for selection related to going outside for a loan. Both 
the OLS and TSLS results are very similar to those obtained with the correction. 
  34 A. Lender Location 
  There are 285 positive-interest-rate loans between households in our data.
31  
These data are used to estimate a probit model for lender location, where yh=1 (=0) when 
borrower h resides in the same (different) district as its lender and Prob(yh=1) = 
Prob(γ ).  The estimated coefficients from the probit are reported in Table 5. We 
include two broad sets of attributes, those of the borrower, and those of the village in 
which he resides. Borrower attributes include their predicted income, household size, 
shocks to the household over 1935 (harvest shock or death in the family), as well as the 
age of the head of the household, the number of years the household has been in the 
village, clan membership, and a measure of the household’s market interaction. The latter 
three variables are designed to capture the socio-economic network of the household. 
Village attributes, on the other hand, are intended to capture the extent of local economic 
opportunities and include a measure of agriculture commercialization, the percentage of 
households that are economically autarkic, population density, the distance to the county 
seat, and the mean real local wage.
h h Z ε ≥ '
32  Definitions of these variables are provided in 
Appendix B.   
  The noteworthy aspect of this probit is that village attributes are significant while 
borrower attributes are generally unimportant.  A household's decision to borrow locally, 
i.e., remain in-district for a loan, tends to increase with our measures of the level of local 
economic activity.  This is expected to the extent that local borrowing opportunities are 
correlated with local economic activity. Borrowers are also more likely to remain in-
district the greater the potential supply of lenders (as captured by the population density) 
and the greater the distance to the county seat (which may offer alternative sources of 
credit).   
  Two household attributes appear to be important: The number of years a 
household's family has resided in a village, and clan membership.  Years-in-village has a 
significant positive effect on the probability of staying in-district for a loan if that 
household is not a member of a village clan.  Clan membership offsets the years’ effect 
                                                 
31There are 291 loans in all but 6 are missing information.   
32We experimented with alternative measures of borrower and village attributes, and versions of this probit, but 
found that they offered no additional insight. 
  35 and, by itself, has a positive effect on the probability of borrowing in-district.  We view 
years-in-village and clan membership to be measures of the extent of a household's local 
economic and social network; as such, we expect them to enhance the viability of 
community enforcement and, hence, make larger community-enforced fixed-duration 
loans available to households that borrow in-district. 
 
B. Loan Size and Duration 
  Table 6 contains separate estimates of the loan-size and duration equations for 
agreements between households residing in the same and different district.  Given our 
maintained hypotheses, these estimates correspond to loans negotiated in regimes with 
and without community enforcement.  The probit reported in Table 5 is used to correct 
these equations for possible selection effects due to the residencies of the borrower and 
lender.    
 
B.1 Effect of Duration on Loan Size: OLS 
  Columns (IDa) and (ODa) report in-district and out-of-district OLS estimates, 
respectively, of the effects of the fixed-duration dummy variable,  , on loan size in a 
regression model that adds a set of borrower controls and a selection correction for the 
choice of lender location.  Borrower controls include the household’s predicted income, 
household size, the age of the head of the household, and two household shock variables, 
namely, a death in the family and the harvest shock. We also include the relationship 
between the parties.  Out-of-district, households can be either related or acquainted (and 
not related); the omitted category is not related or acquainted. In-district, since all 
households report being at least acquainted with the lender, we only include a dummy for 
being related. We also identify parties that live in the same village. 
h Dur
  Fixed-duration has a significant, positive effect on the size of in-district loans. On 
average, these fixed-duration loans are estimated to be 3.46 yuan larger; this is a 
substantial effect as the average in-district loan is 9.36 yuan.  Out-of-district, in contrast, 
the effect of fixed-duration on loan size is much smaller and in fact statistically 
insignificant. In-district, we also find that loan size is positively correlated with the 
household’s predicted income and our measures of shocks to the household’s welfare.  
  36 Households experiencing deaths in the family and negative farm shocks take out larger 
loans; only the latter effect is statistically significant. Loans from relatives are also 
slightly larger, while those from fellow villagers tend to be smaller.  Out-of-district, the 
effects of the household-level variables are fairly similar to those observed in-district. 
Note, however, that the relationship between the parties has no bearing on loan size out-
of-district.   
  These preliminary results are consistent with the view that households negotiate 
fixed-duration loans in-district that rely on community enforcement, which allows them 
to promise credibly to repay more than they could otherwise, and that this technology is 
unavailable out-of-district when lenders and borrowers reside far apart.   
 
B.2 Effect of Duration on Loan Size: TSLS 
  Loan size and contract duration are negotiated together, and so the error term in 
the size equation may be correlated with the probability of negotiating a fixed-duration 
loan.  This will bias our estimate of the effect of contract duration on loan size. Candidate 
instruments for duration are measures of household interaction in the village, and village-
level variables that affect the differential communication-coordination costs of 
implementing fixed-duration and open-ended loans but do not have independent effects 
on loan size.  This is because Prob( =1) increases with the difference between h's 
benefit from its best fixed-duration loan and from its best open-ended loan, and decreases 
with the differential cost of implementing these two loans. 
h Dur
  We use a combination of household-level and village-level variables as 
instruments.  The household-level variables are selected to capture the density of the 
borrower’s local socio-economic network, and include the age of the head of the 
households, the number of years the household has resided in the village, clan 
membership, market participation, as well as the household’s relationship with the lender. 
The village-level variables, on the other hand, are meant to reflect the costs of 
coordinating community sanctions, and include the percentage of households that are 
autarkic, the population density, and the degree of commercialization in the village.  We 
discuss the first-stage regressions, reported in (IDb) and (ODb), separately below. 
  37   In columns (IDc) and (ODc), we report the TSLS estimates for the effect of loan 
duration on loan size. Both set of estimates easily pass the over-id test. In-district, fixed 
duration has a positive and significant effect that is almost twice as large as that estimated 
using OLS. Recall that in-district, fixed-duration loans can be either personally or 
community enforced. Our explanation for the larger TSLS coefficient is that, under our 
identification strategy, we are now effectively estimating the impact of fixed duration 
from those households who are accessing fixed duration in the context of community 
enforcement. We will offer additional support for this interpretation in our discussions of 
the first-stage regressions. Out-of-district, on the other hand, the effect of a fixed duration 
is now actually negative, albeit insignificant.  Theory predicts that these loans should be 
no larger than their open-ended counterparts. Out-of-district, as well as in-district, the rest 
of the coefficients on the household-level variables are fairly similar to those obtained 
using OLS. 
   Two variables in the loan size equation in-district merit additional discussion, 
namely, contracting with relatives, or a fellow villager. We observe that loans with 
relatives are larger.  Personal sanctions are arguably greater (and community sanctions 
are marginally so) when the lender is also a relative.  In both instances, the borrower can 
credibly promise to repay larger sums, whether the loan is fixed or open, and so larger 
loans will be forthcoming. In this context, the negative coefficient of Both Villagers in 
(IDc) is curious as the argument appears to be the same as with the Related variable; that 
is, personal sanctions will presumably be larger when the lender and borrower are 
neighbors and interact more frequently.  Unlike the Related variable, however, Both 
Villagers has a community-enforcement selection effect that works in the opposite 
direction.  A borrower who contracts with a lender residing in the same village is likely to 
have a localized community enforcement network, i.e., limited to the borrower's village 
(the villages in our sample contain an average of 50 households).  Contracting with a 
non-villager (in the same district) suggests that a wider network is accessed that can 
correspondingly impose greater collective sanctions and therefore make larger loans self-
enforcing.
33 
                                                 
33This view is entirely consistent with the notion that households borrow outside their villages to secure larger 
loans than would be available on the inside. 
  38   
B.3  Determinants of Contract Duration (First-stage Regressions) 
  Columns (IDb) and (ODb) report first-stage in-district and out-of-district 
regressions, respectively, for duration. We expect that the costs of implementing fixed-
duration and open-ended loans will differ across regimes.   Out-of-district, fixed-duration 
and open-ended loans both rely on personal enforcement and a fixed duration is adopted 
only when the lender is at an informational disadvantage with respect to the borrower's 
ability to pay; the differential enforcement cost of an open-ended loan,  , is the cost of 
making the borrower's ability to pay known to the lender.  In-district, on the other hand, 
we hypothesize that the use of fixed-duration loans is tied heavily to the use of 
community enforcement, and thus related to household- and community-level variables 
enhancing community enforcement. Thus, while the same variables are used in (IDb) and 
(ODb) to capture the effect of the borrower's relationships with other households on the 
differential cost of a fixed-duration loan, these variables are expected to have different 
effects in each regime. 
P C
 
B.3.a Lender-borrower relationship   
  For each credit agreement, we know whether the borrower and lender are related, 
are acquainted but not related, or are neither related nor acquainted; as well, for in-district 
loans, we know if the lender resides in the borrower's village.  Since the cost of 
communicating with other households will not substantially depend on the borrower-
lender relationship, this relationship should not appreciably affect the extra cost of 
implementing a loan in-district that involves community enforcement.  As expected, the 
coefficients of the Related and Both Villagers dummy variables in (IDb) are statistically 
insignificant; the Acquainted dummy variable is suppressed in model (IDb) since all in-
district borrower-lender pairs in our data are either related or acquainted.
34  
                                                 
34 Since all in-district lender-borrower pairs are already acquainted, we expect the lender’s monitoring 
cost, , to be relatively small in this setting.  When C , open-ended loans dominate fixed-duration 
loans that rely on personal enforcement because V .  Households will then negotiate fixed-
duration loans only if they rely on community enforcement and thereby facilitate larger loans.     








  39   Out-of-district, households should choose fixed-duration loans (with personal 
enforcement) only when the lender's information on the borrower's ability to pay is 
limited.  Since the lender is expected to have more information on the borrower when 
they are related or at least acquainted (as they live in different districts), the Related and 
Acquainted variables should have a negative effect on the probability of negotiating a 
fixed-duration loan.  As some borrower-lender pairs are neither related nor acquainted, 
we can estimate the coefficient of the Acquainted dummy variable in the out-of-district 
equation.  The coefficients of Related and Acquainted in (ODb) are negative and 
significant. 
 
B.3.b Borrower-community relationship  
  We are interested in the extent to which a borrower is socially and economically 
connected to other households in its village.  For in-district loans, we expect these 
connections to facilitate coordinating those future credit and non-credit exchanges 
between the borrower and other households that underlie community enforcement.  These 
connections can increase the likelihood of negotiating a fixed-duration loan only if fixed-
duration loans relay on community enforcement.  For loans involving out-of-district 
personal enforcement, however, these connections should be relatively unimportant for 
the choice between fixed-duration and open-ended loans since they are unlikely to make 
additional borrower information available to the lender. 
  We observe the number of years a household's family has resided in a village 
(Years in Village), whether the household is a member of a village clan (Clan 
Membership), and the extent to which a household participates in the land and labor 
markets (Market Index).  In-district, years in village, clan membership and market 
participation increase the likelihood of a fixed-duration loan, which is consistent with our 
view that in-district fixed-duration loans include some that rely on community 
enforcement; the negative interaction terms indicate that clan membership and market 
participation are per se less important for borrowers whose families have a long history in 
the village.  Out-of-district, where we argue that fixed-duration loans rely on personal 
enforcement, we find that these measures of a borrower's network are empirically 
unimportant. 
  40  
B.3.c Village attributes   
  In some villages, it is easier to coordinate households' exchanges to implement 
community loan enforcement than in other villages.  The relevant set of households 
includes those that interact frequently with a given borrower, or may do so in the future.  
We expect that the costs of coordinating these households will be lower in situations 
where they are more easily identified, i.e., in villages characterized by lower overall 
levels of economic activity and social interaction, and with smaller numbers of active 
players and alternative exchange opportunities.   
  We consider three measures of village activity: The percentage of households that 
do not participate in either land, labor or credit markets (Autarky); the population density 
(Pop Den); and the percentage of agricultural output that is sold (Commercialization). 
Thus, as input markets become thinner (Autarky increases), as output markets become 
less active (Commercialization decreases), and as population density decreases (Pop Den 
falls), a given borrower’s exchanges are more likely to be limited to a smaller number of 
households.  In this setting, community-enforced loans should be relatively less costly 
and more attractive.  Fixed-duration loans that rely on community enforcement are 
certainly consistent with the in-district results in column (IDb), where autarky and 
population density both have significant effects at 0.025 percent. 
    Out-of-district, on the other hand, fixed-duration loans rely on personal 
enforcement. What is relevant in the choice of a fixed-duration loan is a lender's cost of 
monitoring a borrower who resides in a village outside his district, C , as the relevant 
payoffs areV  and V .  And, here we observe that fixed duration is 
significantly less likely in more commercialized and densely populated areas. An 
interpretation consistent with this finding is that the costs of obtaining information and of 
monitoring the borrower are lower in these environments, thus making open-ended loans 








8. Final Remarks 
  Households in remote villages of low-income economies face restricted access to 
financial and legal institutions.  In consequence, credit is exchanged directly between 
  41 households using informal (largely verbal) loan agreements.  A number of researchers 
have noted that some loan agreements between households are open-ended while others 
have fixed durations, but have failed to ask why.  In a world where consumption 
(investment) loans are open-ended (fixed duration) and supplied by households (money 
lenders or landlords), it is easy to see why the question of loan duration may be deemed 
uninteresting.  In fact, the world we study is very different.   Drawing on a sample of loan 
contracts from rural China in the 1930s, we establish that loan purpose has little to do 
with loan duration or lender occupation. We observe individuals who are neither 
moneylenders nor landlords supplying consumption loans that have fixed durations, and 
investment loans that are open ended. 
This paper is the first to develop and test a theory of loan contract duration. For 
the remote village economies considered here, it is reasonable to begin by restricting 
attention to loans that are self-enforcing.  However, whether the lender exclusively 
enforces the loan through personal enforcement or other households are involved via 
community enforcement, the sanctions that can be imposed on a borrower are essentially 
the same and fall into one of two groups: Credit sanctions and any other kind of sanction, 
or non-credit sanctions for short.   
Collateral, which is property pledged as a guarantee for loan repayment, is an 
obvious vehicle for imposing non-credit sanctions on a borrower.  In our setting, 
however, collateral is problematic as many borrowers simply do not own property that 
can be pledged.  And for those that do, there is the added complication that transferring 
this property must also be voluntary and self-enforcing.  Not surprisingly, then, the 
percentage of loans that use collateral in our sample is very small.   
The fact that so few informal loans required collateral suggests that there must 
have been substitutes available for effecting non-credit sanctions.  The obvious source for 
these substitutes is household relationships.  Households residing in the same or adjacent 
villages are often related or well acquainted, and interact repeatedly, both socially and 
economically.  Since a lender who is involved in these exchanges with a borrower can 
withdraw them when loan payments are not forthcoming, these non-credit exchanges are 
a ready source for non-credit sanctions. 
  42   We argue in this paper that the distinguishing feature of a fixed-duration loan is 
simply that it creates a “breathing space” for the borrower during which non-credit 
sanctions are prohibited.  With a fixed-duration loan, the threat to impose non-credit 
sanctions is postponed until the end of the loan period.  An open-ended loan, on the 
other hand, does not shield the borrower from sanctions, even in the short term.  As a 
result, the only circumstance in which a borrower would negotiate an open-ended loan 
is when this breathing space is unnecessary, specifically, when a state-contingent loan is 
feasible.  Sanctions are then imposed only when the borrower is able but unwilling to 
make an agreed upon payment. 
 State-contingent  sanctions  are feasible when the party or parties charged with 
enforcing the terms of a loan are able to monitor the borrower’s ability to pay, i.e., his 
income and financial needs.  When this information is costly or unavailable, state-
contingent sanctions are ruled out.  Sanctions are still required to encourage repayment, 
but may now be mistakenly imposed on a borrower who is unable to pay because this 
information is private.  In this situation, a fixed-duration loan offers a borrower short-
term protection against “inappropriate” sanctions.  The cost of a fixed-duration loan is 
that by encouraging borrowers to delay payment, it generally results in a smaller loan 
than otherwise.  
  Our empirical work confirms that fixed-duration loans are indeed smaller then 
open-ended loans, and that the likelihood of negotiating an open-ended (state-
contingent) loan increases when the parties have a close social relationship.  On the 
enforcement side, we provide considerable evidence that households which live near 
each other are more likely to negotiate community-enforced loans than those that live 
far apart, and that the incidence of these loans is greater in villages in which small 
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Table 1: Breakdown of Loans by Type and Attributes (1935) 
                
Loan type  Zero Interest  Positive 
Interest 
Land Mortgage  Pawns 
                
Duration Type  Fixed  Open  Fixed  Open  Fixed  Open  Fixed  Open 
                
Number of Loans  93  275  155  148  12  30  58  3 
                
Written (%)  1.1  1.5  12.3  8.8  58.3  42.3  13.8  0 
Third Party (%)  3.2  2.5  16.9  8.8  50.0  26.9  0  0 
Collateral (%)  1.1  1.5  5.2  3.3  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
No Security (%)  95.7  95.4  73.5  83.8  0  0  0  0 
                
Related  (%)  54.8 51.2  45.2 56.9 25.0  42.3 1.8  0 
Same Village (%)  28.0  19.6  16.8  10.1  16.7  36.7  0  0 
Same District (%)  45.2  43.2  58.1  58.1  75.0  36.7  10.3  0 
                
Average Size (yuan)
1 6.57  6.41  15.48  9.45  61.13  29.8  2.13  3.67 
                
Purpose (%)
2                
    Consumption  68.2  67.3  66.9  54.4  55.0  85.7  66.7  89.3 
     Investment  27.1  27.1  27.7  44.2  40.0  14.3  0.0  10.7 
     Other  4.7  5.6  5.4  1.4  5.0  0.0  33.3  0.0 
        
Notes:  1. Loan size is expressed in “real” yuan, by deflating nominal yuan by the local price of 
grain (the numeraire). 2. A consumption loan includes loans for consumption purposes, 
emergencies, and ceremonies; investment includes fixed and current investment, as well as 
education expenses; and other includes loan repayment, taxes, rents, and other miscellaneous uses. 
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Table 2: Occupational Distribution of Borrowers and Lenders (1935) 
    
Loan Type  Positive, Fixed Duration  Positive, Open-ended 
 Lender  Borrower  Lender  Borrower 
      
Occupation    % % % % 
      
   Landlord  9.7  3.9  6.1  3.4 
   Farmer             54.8  87.7  58.1  77.7 
   Wage Labor
1  8.4  1.9 10.1 14.2 
   Commerce  12.9  0  10.8  0.7 
   Professional
2  3.9 4.5 5.4 2.7 
   Moneylender  1.9  0  0  0 
   Unknown  8.4  1.9  9.5  1.4 
    
Notes: 1. Wage laborer primarily includes farm laborers, but also some 
individuals hiring out in non-agricultural activity. 2. Professional includes 
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Table  3: Average Loan Size by Duration Type and Residency (1935)
1 
          










 (yuan)  (yuan)    (yuan) 
       Borrower and Lender: 
      
     Reside in Same District  11.00  7.31  2.23  9.38 
     Reside in Different Districts  10.87  9.34  0.94  10.00 
        
Totals 10.94  8.51    9.71 
Note: 1. Loan size is expressed in “real” yuan. 
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Table 4: Households’ Portfolio and Borrowing and Repayment Activity (1935) 
      
  Number of 
Households 
Number of Households 
Borrowing in 1935 
Number of Households Making 
Payment in 1935 on Loans 
Outstanding as of Beg. of 1935 
Loan Type
1     Total 





No outstanding loans as of 
beginning of 1935 
794 244  124  88  32     
              
Outstanding loans as of 
beginning of 1935 
301 146  85  31  30  140  11 
            
   Of which:             
              
      No loans in default 
      as of beginning  of 1935 
268 131  80  23  28  114  NA 
              
      At least one loan in     
      default as of beginning 
      of 1935 
33 15  5  8  2  26  11 
              
Total 1095  390  209  119  62  140  11 
              
Note:   1. OE refers to open-ended loans, and FD refers to fixed duration loans; thus, 124 (88) refer to the 
number of households borrowing exclusively by open-ended (fixed duration) loans. “Both” refers to the 
households borrowing by both types. 
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                       Table 5:  Summary Measures of Village (Community) Attributes 
       Mean         SD     Minimum    Maximum 
Village  Variable      
      
Village age      121.6        95.2          24         350 
Years in Village        59.2        55.1       10.2      173.7 
% of HH in Clan        46.0        21.1       12.0        89.2 
Pop. Density        0.18        0.14       0.06        0.67 
% HH Autarkic        15.9        14.4         0.0        57.0 
Commercialization (%)        23.7        12.2         5.5        50.3 
 
Notes: Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. 
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Table 6: Probit Regressions for Contracts In District versus Out of District 
      
Intercept 1.543 
(0.65) 
  Market Participation Index  -.056 
(.12) 




Village Attributes   
Borrower Attributes      Local Wage  .925* 
(.25) 
  Predicted Income   -.004** 
(.002) 
  Commercialization  1.594** 
(.82) 
  Household Size  .029 
(.031) 
  Population density  .357** 
(.17) 
  Age of Head   -.004 
(.006) 
  Distance to County Seat  .009* 
(.003) 
  Years in Village   .015* 
(.004) 
  % HH Autarkic  -3.068* 
(.84) 
  Clan Member  .303 
(.222) 
     
  Clan Member*Years   -.015 
(.004) 
  
  Farm Shock  .203 
(1.01) 
  
  Death in Family  .173 
(0.66) 
  
      
Observations 285  R
2 .111 
Note: Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. 
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Table 7: Loan Size and Contract Duration Type 
  In District Loans  Out of District Loans 









Loan Size  Fixed 
Duration 
Loan Size 

































Household Attributes            




























































Years in Village    .002 
(.001) 
   .003 
(.003) 
 
Clan Member    .862* 
(.21) 
   .139 
(.22) 
 
Market Index    .333* 
(.08) 
   .126 
(.08) 
 
Clan*Years   -.004** 
(.02) 
   -.004 
(.003) 
 
Market*Years   -.336* 
(.11) 
   .010 
(.11) 
 
B-L Relationship            




















   
Village Attributes            
% HH Autarkic    1.087** 
(.50) 
   -.208 
(.52) 
 
Population Density    -.214** 
(.09) 
   -.187** 
(.081) 
 
Commercialization   -.247 
(.475) 
   -1.139** 
(.50) 
 




   






            
Sargan Over-ID Test (P-value)      .744      .890 
Observations 131  131  131  154  154  154 
R
2 0.384  0.321  0.380  0.449  0.218  0.532 
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Appendix A 
A. Derivation of (2a,b)  
  We determine values for   and  , and beliefs concerning the evolution of 
household debt, so that the strategies described in the text comprise a sub-game perfect 
equilibrium (SPE).   
* m
* * m
Let   denote the amount that household h owes to household i at the 
beginning of sub-period t ,  ; when there is no confusion, we write m  instead 
of  .  The total amount that h owes to lenders I at the beginning of t  is 
. 













hI ∈ Σ =   
z
m m
Since loan transactions are observed but not recorded, a common set of beliefs is 
imposed following any history of loans and payments.  Specifically, if i rejects h’s loan 
offer {} n   , h’s obligations to both i and I at the beginning of the next debt-
servicing sub-period,t , are unchanged, whence   and  .  If i accepts 
h’s offer,   is defined by: 
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According to (A.1a), an obligation resulting from a loan that is supplied to a borrower 
who has already exhausted his community line of credit is ignored; according to (A.1c), 
any new loan obligation that removes a borrower’s incentive to service its outstanding 
debt (by raising the amount owed above m ) is partially forgiven to restore this 
incentive.  These beliefs have the property that all parities ignore new loan obligations 
*
  55 that undermine h’s incentive to repay its outstanding debt.
35   The total amount that all 
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Let  , or   for short, denote the amount paid by borrower h to 
lender i in debt servicing sub-period t .
0 ) ( ≥ t hi ρ
hi I i ρ ∈ Σ
h
hi ρ
2 36  The total amount paid by h in t  to lenders 
in I is .  Borrower h pays   if  , and   otherwise.  






hi hi m = ρ m m
 
(A.2)     { } hi hi hi m ρ − =
2 3 , 0 max m . 
 
The total amount that h owes to I at the beginning of t  is m .   
  Suppose that borrower h owes   to lenders in I at the beginning of  .  
Let   denote h’s payoff when borrowing from any  , given that h already 
owes m to lenders in I.  Since h can continue to borrow only if m , 
* m m ≤
2 t
) (m M j∈









   if                       0




m m m m V
m
We now describe h’s payoffs from paying m in   and from postponing payment to 
t+1.  Assuming that all parties follow their equilibrium strategies in all subsequent 




] 1 ( ) ( [
* L m LV m α α γ− + + −  , 
 
                                                 
35An alternative modeling approach is to introduce verifiable loan obligations to condition (i) trigger 
strategies to mimic the punishment of lenders in (A.1a), and (ii) contract renegotiation to mimic the debt 
forgiveness in (A.1c).  With these complications, (A.1a) and (A.1c) then describe outcomes off the 
equilibrium path of the game. 
36The reason why payments are subscripted is that while borrowers h and h’ have identical production 
functions and matching probabilities, they are likely to have different debt portfolios as a consequence of 
different matching histories.  Different obligations to lenders translate into different payment patterns. 
  56 where γ  and X denotes h’s expected payoff from borrowing outside the 
community involved with collective loan enforcement.  The payoff from postponing 
payment of m to the next debt-servicing sub-period is
) 1 /( δ δ − =
37 
 
X L m LM L ) 1 ( ) ( [ α α δ− + + ∆ − ]] ) 1 ( ) ( [
* X L m LV m α α γ− + + − .   
  
Thus, h prefers to pay   to lenders in I in period t if 
* m m ≤
 
(A.3)     [ ] () m m M m V L L δ δα − ≥ − + ∆ 1 ) ( ) (
*  . 
 
It follows that the maximum amount which h can credibly promise to pay lenders in I, 
, is the largest value of m that satisfies (A.3), and therefore solves: 
* m
 
(A.4a)         .  ()
* * 1 ) ( m m LV L δ δα − = + ∆
 
  We now determine h’s line of credit with lenders from I.  There is actually a 
range of possible values consistent with equilibrium.  Using the definition of m  from 
(A.4a), we rewrite (A.3) as 
*
() ( ) m m − −
* 1 δ    when   and  ) (
* m m LV − ≥δ α
* * m m ≤
() ( ) m m − −
* 1 δ
* * m m ≤
() 1
* x δα δ= −
* m >
 ≥  when m .   This version of (A.3)) simplifies to   
when  , and   when  , where   satisfies 
 and  ; from (A.4a), we know that  , 
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37Instead of postponing payment of m, the borrower could alternatively pay   in   and postpone 
paying   to the next debt-servicing sub-period, which yields 




X L m LM L m ) 1 ( ) ( [ ) 1 ( α β α δ β − + + ∆ − − − ]] ) 1 ( ) ( [
* X L m LV m α α γ β − + + − .   
 
This payoff is an increasing function of   if and only if  .  It follows from (A.4b) 
below, which defines  , that this inequality is satisfied for  ; hence, given that some payment 
is postponed, it is optimal to postpone the maximum amount possible, i.e. set  =1.)   
β ) ( ' ) 1 ( m LM β δα δ − > −




  57 * * m m ≤ , it follows that each element of the set [  is a candidate value of  .  
Now, for each ω , there exists a SPE in which each lender i  is willing 
to accept a loan offer from borrower h only when the total amount that h owes to all 
lenders from I does not exceed ω .  As lenders are indifferent among [  while 
h prefers the largest value (because it maximizes the amount of debt h can carry before 
credit sanctions are imposed), we define  = , so that   satisfies  
] , 0
* * x m −
* * x m −
* * m
] , 0 [
* * x m − ∈ I ∈
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Expression A.4a, and A.4b correspond to 2a and 2b in the text. 
 
B. Deriving (5)-(6)    
  We aim to determine values for { m  and { }  
* * that support an 
equilibrium in which open-ended loans may alternatively be enforced with personal or 
community sanctions.  We consider a situation in which loans are repaid sequentially to 
different lenders within each debt-servicing sub-period,  i.e., if borrower h owes 
{ } at the beginning of t , h sequentially decides whether or not to 
repay each obligation in turn, starting with   and proceeding through the list of 
personally enforced loans from lenders  .
2





 We  restrict  attention  to situations in which δα , so that 
 for each  .  In these circumstances credit sanctions alone are 
insufficient to induce borrowers to repay their loans and so, as confirmed later below, 
 and  , where 0< <  when  .  We assume that  . 
≤
0 > ∆
( − ≤ 1




* m 0 > ∆
  Suppose that borrower h has outstanding loans at the beginning of t .  Some of 
these loans are community-enforced, with total obligation  .  The remaining 
2
* 2 m mhI ≤
                                                 
38The community-enforced loans that comprise   are repaid simultaneously.  This can happen before 
personally enforced loans repaid, between the repayment of personal loans from different lenders, or after 
all personally enforced loans have been repaid; as well, the order in which personally enforced loans are 
repaid is inconsequential.  
2
hI m
  58 loans are enforced personally by lender i, and have corresponding obligation  .  
There are no other personal obligations, i.e.,   for  ; our results do not 
depend on the latter assumption.  To simplify notation, let   and  .   
* 2 w whi ≤
2
hi w
* m m ≤
0
2 = hj w i j ≠
m =
2
hI m w =
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  We first consider borrower h’s decision to repay m.  As h expects to 
subsequently repay  , it follows from our earlier analysis that h will pay   
to lenders in I in period t, rather than postpone payment to t+1, if 
* w w ≤
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That is, h can continue to borrow using community enforced loans if  , and h 
prefers community enforced loans if  .  Since the LHS of (A.5) is strictly 
positive at  , and is an increasing, concave function on   that is bounded 
above, we define   to be the value of m for which (A.5) holds as an equality.  Hence, 
m




(A.6)                , 
* 1 ) ( [ m V L L δα = − + ∆
 
which gives (5).  To confirm that  , we show that (A.5) is satisfied for any 
candidate  .  Observe that   implies that  
* * * m m =
1− ] , 0 [
* * * m m ∈ () ) 0 (
 
(A.7a)        ,  () ≥ − − ) ( 1
* m m δ LV δα ≥ ) m −
 
while m implies that 
* m ≤
 
  59 (A.7b)     0 .  () ≥ − − ) ( 1
* m m δ
  
Given the definition of   in (A.6), (A.7a) is equivalent to (A.5) when   and 
, while (A.7b) is equivalent to (A.5) otherwise.  It follows that (A.5) is 
satisfied for any m  in the interval [ ; we then set   as a larger line of 
credit is a Pareto-improvement. 
* m
* * m m ≤
* * w m m ≥ −
* * ] , 0
* m
* * * m m =
  We now consider borrower h’s decision to repay w, taking an unpaid 
community obligation   as given.  There are four cases to consider:   ] , 0 [
* m m∈
 
(i) If  , h will next borrow using a community enforced loan 
independent of whether it repays w.  Since h’s only benefit from paying w to i is its 
non-credit exchange with i, paying will dominate postponement if 
w w w m m − ≥ ≥ −
* * *
 
(A.8a)      .  () w δ − ≥ ∆ 1
 
(ii) If  , h will resort to community enforced loans in the 
following period only if repayment of w is postponed.  Hence, payment dominates 
postponement if 
w w m m w − ≥ − >
* * *
 
(A.8b)         δ + ∆ .  () w m m V w V δ α − ≥ − − 1 )] ( ) ( [
* *
 
(iii) If   and  , h will use personally enforced loans in the 
following period, whether or not repayment of w is postponed.  Payment then 
dominates postponement if  
m m w w w − > − ≥
* * * * * w w ≤
 
(A.8c)         δ + ∆ .  () w w w V w V δ α − ≥ − − 1 )] ( ) ( [
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  60 (iv) And if   but  , h will resort to community enforced 
loans in the following period if repayment of w is postponed, and so payment dominates 
postponement if (A.8b) is satisfied. 
m m w w w − > − ≥
* * * * * w w >
  Since a borrower’s community obligation cannot exceed  , this obligation will 
be repaid as soon as possible in equilibrium.  As a result, m=0 whenever a borrower is 
deciding whether or not to repay a personal obligation along the equilibrium path of the 
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which gives (6).
39  Finally, (A.6) and (A.9) show that  . 
* * m w <
 
   
 
 
   
                                                 
39 It is clear that (A.8a,b,c) are satisfied for all  ; off the equilibrium path, when the borrower’s 
community obligations are large enough to affect its personal loan options, the incentive to repay w is 
actually enhanced, as revealed by (A.8b,c). 
* w w ≤





Appendix B: Explanatory Variables 
Variable Definition 
   
Consumption Loan 
Dummy 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if loan is either for consumption purposes, emergency, 
or ceremony. 
Farm Shock  % of  household’s cultivated farm with yield less than half of “normal” yield  (as 
defined by the surveyors) in 1935 
Death in Family  Dummy variable = 1 if family experienced death in family in 1935 
Pred. Income  Households’ predicted income based on household’s landholdings and labor, valued at 
mean village returns  
Household Size  # of individuals in the household 
Age of Head  Age of the head of the household 
  
Years in Village  # of years that the family (including ancestors) have lived in the village 
Clan Member  Dummy variable = 1 if family is a member of clan or kinship group 
Market Index  Index of household participation in local land and labor markets (rent-in, rent-out, 
hire-in, hire-out). Assumes value between 0 and 4. 
  
Parties Related  Borrower and Lender related 
Acquainted Borrower  and  Lender acquainted with each other 
Live Same Village  Borrower and Lender live in the same village 
  
% HH Autarkic  % of households in the village that do not participate in either land, labor or credit 
markets 
Population Density  Village population divided by cultivated land 
Commercialization  % of farm output marketed by households in the village. 
Distance to County 
    Seat 
Distance from the village to the county seat, the local center of economic and 
administrative activity. 
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